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Abstract—Programmable Logic Controllers are an integral
component for managing many different industrial processes
(e.g., smart building management, power generation, water
and wastewater management, and traffic control systems), and
manufacturing and control industries (e.g., oil and natural gas,
chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage,
automotive, and aerospace). Despite being used widely in many
critical infrastructures, PLCs use protocols which make these
control systems vulnerable to many common attacks, including
man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service attacks, and memory
corruption attacks (e.g., array, stack, and heap overflows, integer
overflows, and pointer corruption). In this paper, we propose
PLC-PROV, a system for tracking the inputs and outputs of the
control system to detect violations in the safety and security
policies of the system. We consider a smart building as an
example of a PLC-based system and show how PLC-PROV can
be applied to ensure that the inputs and outputs are consistent
with the intended safety and security policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems rely on automation to ensure safe
and efficient operation of many industrial processes including
power generation, water and wastewater management, traffic
control systems, petroleum and manufacturing industries (e.g.,
oil and natural gas pipelines, chemical and pharmaceutical
production, pulp and paper manufacturing, food and beverage
production, and automotive and aerospace assembly). These
industries rely heavily on automation to reduce cost and ensure
safety of potentially dangerous operations. In the past, these
control networks have been isolated from other networks, such
as the internet, but we are seeing more and more of these types
of networks being connected to the internet [1], [2], [3]. Often,
the goal is to further reduce impact on humans as this new
connection enables remote management. However, often the
implications of connecting these safety critical control systems
is not carefully considered. In many instances, attacks on these
systems can lead to disruption of critical services and even loss
of human life [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9].
One of the biggest problems with this scenario is that the
security of these control networks is limited at best. The
communication protocols used in these control networks lack
authentication and integrity checking for messages [10]. These
weaknesses make it possible to initiate many commonly-
known attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of
service attacks, memory corruption attacks, replay attacks,
and spoofing attacks. While enterprise networks can rely on a
wide-range of security mechanisms including IPsec, transport
layer security (TLS), and virtual private networks (VPNs) to
secure their communications, such mechanisms are difficult to
deploy on these control networks, leaving them vulnerable to
network-based attackers. Furthermore, many of the commonly
applied mitigations fail to cover PLC-based systems [11].
What is needed are mechanisms that can monitor the inputs
and outputs of the ICS and ensure that critical safety properties
are not violated. This requires an understanding of the desired
safety properties, a way to track inputs and outputs, and a
mechanism to model the evolution of the system from inputs to
outputs. With these mechanisms in place, it becomes possible
to ensure that the PLCs do not send commands to actuators
that violate the safety and security policies of the system.
In this paper, we propose PLC-PROV, a mechanism to track
the inputs and outputs of the system and compare them against
the specified safety and security properties. PLC-PROV re-
lies on tracking data provenance for the PLCs and using
that provenance to determine if a violation has occurred.
Provenance, in short, is the “history of data transformed by
a system”, and has been proposed as a building block for
systems that require the ability to reason about the context
in which an action is taken. Since PLCs are entirely event-
driven, context is vitally important, and as such provenance is
a natural fit for this sort of analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides relevant background information on PLCs and data
provenance. Section III presents the design of PLC-PROV and
walks through a simple example to highlight how the system
works. Finally, Sections IV and V detail related work and
conclude.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Programmable Logic Controllers
Figure 1 shows a notional Industrial Control System, com-
prised of several components that together provide the ability
to automate industrial processes. At the heart of this system
is the Programmable Logic Controller, or PLC. The PLC
takes input from the sensors and determines the appropriate
commands for the actuators to adjust the environment. The
logic for the PLC comes from an engineering workstation
that contains the IDE used by the programmer to develop
the application logic for the ICS. Additionally, an ICS has
one or more Human Machine Interfaces, or HMIs, that enable
operators to view current and historical data from the ICS.
The historical data is stored in the data historian and is often
used for post-facto analysis of events.
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Fig. 1. A simple PLC-based control system with the basic components of any industrial control system.
The PLC applications are written in one of several program-
ming languages including Instruction Lists (IL), Structured
Text (ST), Functional Block Diagram (FBD), and Ladder
Logic (LL). Regardless of the programming language used
the instructions control the features of the PLC including
I/O control, communication, logical decisions, timing, count-
ing, three mode proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control,
arithmetic, and data and file processing. The inputs to the
PLC come from a wide array of sensors such as temperature
sensors, motion detectors, smoke detectors, water leak detec-
tors, and surveillance cameras. The outputs of the PLC go to
actuators that adjust the current environment. These actuators
include thermostats, humidifiers, speakers, security cameras,
video doorbells, door locks, and window blinds.
The topology of an ICS network can be broadly divided
into two subnets. The first is the control network where the
sensors and actuators interface with the PLC. In more complex
ICS environments, there may also be a Master Terminal Unit,
or MTU, that provides the control programs for the PLCs.
This control network uses non-IP-based protocols such as
Modbus [12]. The second network is the corporate network,
where the historian, HMI, and engineering workstation are
located. This is a traditional enterprise network, using standard
IP protocols to communicate. In order to link the corporate
and control networks, interface cards are used to provide a
bridge between IP-based protocols and the Modbus protocol.
The PLC uses a Modbus/TCP protocol to send data to the
historian. The historian also provides an HTTP interface for
devices like the historian to access the stored historical data.
For a distributed system like SCADA (Supervisory control
and data acquisition) or DCS (Distributed Control System), a
group of PLCs are assigned to different subsystems. This is
mainly done to handle long distance communication among
geographically disperse assets (e.g., power grids, natural gas
pipelines, water distribution, wastewater collection systems,
railway transportation systems). The far-reaching nature of
these systems necessitates numerous control systems responsi-
ble for controlling local operations, but working in concert to
ensure global functioning of the system. While these systems
are more complex, they rely on many of the same basic
components of a smaller-scale ICS.
Even in localized ICS environments (e.g., smart buildings),
it is common to rely on several PLCs that work in concert
to provide a range of functions. Consider for example that
there might be a PLC that controls the heating, ventilation,
and cooling, or HVAC, system, one PLC that controls the
elevators, one PLC that controls the door and window locks,
and finally one PLC that monitors for hazard conditions (e.g.,
smoke, carbon monoxide, water and chemical leaks, etc.).
While these systems can be implemented independently, there
are often dependencies that need to be accounted for. Consider
a case where the hazard monitoring PLC detects smoke in
the building, it must send notifications to the elevator and
door/window lock PLCs that this condition is present so that
appropriate actions can be taken. Those actions might be to
open the locks on the doors, and move the elevator to the
ground floor and then lock out use of the elevator. These
dependencies ensure safety and efficiency in these automated
systems.
B. Data Provenance
Data provenance is defined as the “history of data trans-
formed by a system” [13]. The provenance of a piece of data
describes what the inputs and outputs of each process are,
what processes were executed, and who had control of those
processes during execution. Provenance is often represented
as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with nodes representing the
data, processes, and controlling entities. The edges represent
causal relationships between these nodes.
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Fig. 2. PLC-PROV Architecure
Provenance was first introduced in databases and compu-
tational sciences for tracing and debugging. However, more
recently it has been proposed as a primitive for building
secure and resilient systems [14] that can “fight through”
attacks. In order to provide such capabilities, novel collec-
tion, storage, and analysis mechanisms have been proposed
to enable near-real-time analysis of provenance to support
security and resilience decisions [15]. These mechanisms are
being used to provide forensic analysis and intrusion detection
capabilities [16].
III. DESIGN
Due to the distributed nature of PLC systems an attacker can
trigger an event that leads to conflicting actions for the same
object or feature of the plant/environment. Let us consider
a smart building as an example where PLC is used [17],
[18], [19], [20], [21]. An attacker can compromise a carbon
monoxide detector and trigger a false alarm. This sends a
command to the smart windows to open allowing fresh air
into the building. Occupants will evacuate the building and
a thief can use the open windows to enter the building.
Another example can be creating multiple events that trigger
a thermostat to increase and decrease the temperature of a
room at the same time. Sending two different commands in
the thermostat at the same time continuously can damage it,
by artificially shortening the device’s lifespan. In this way,
the attacker not only damages an asset but also may drive
the occupants of the room to leave due to fluctuations in the
comfort level of the room. In addition to the attacks described
above, an attacker can create a series of attacks (cascading
attack) [22]. Moreover, misconfiguration in the smart building
operation is possible as there are numerous rules or policies
for taking actions by the controllers after events have occurred.
A formal methods approach for detecting conflicts in IoT
system is presented in [23]. A PLC-based system (e.g., smart
home, power supply, water supply, wastewater management,
and traffic control system) works on the same sensor-actuator-
controller functionalities. Therefore, we adopted the safety
policies defined in [23] as the basic policies to analyze
using the collected provenance graphs. PLC-PROV will check
whether there is any violation of the defined safety and security
properties. If found, it is reported as an anomaly for the
system, which also provides the administrator with the detailed
traces that are needed to understand the impact of the anomaly.
The basic architecture is given in Figure 2.
The PLC contains the core rules/logic for controlling the
plant/environment. The controller issues command to the ac-
tuators based on these sensor measurements. A PLC has to
be operated with software that provides interaction with the
sensors and actuators. These addresses are mapped as variables
in the source program. In this project, we use CODESYS1
which is a development system for PLC applications. To start,
our framework traces the variables designated for sensors and
actuators. These values of these variables are collected with
timestamps into traces of system execution.
These traces are the input for a provenance management
tool Curator [24]. Curator is a lightweight library which min-
imizes integration complexity for the application developers.
It is also capable of integrating provenance from multiple
levels of abstraction, a feature that enables reasonsing about
provenance both at the sensor reading level (micro) and at
the environment/plant level (macro). As Curator is targeted
for microservice based system, it fits well for our case where
we collect traces from disparate components of the system,
similar to microservices. From there, the provenance graph is
generated, showing the evolution of the system from sensor
readings through the PLC and controller, to the actuators.
Figure 3 is a notional example of the type of graph that is
generated.
The provenance graphs collected by PLC-PROV enable an
administrator to answer the following questions:
• Has an actuator been actuated more than once at the same
time?
• If an actuator receives multiple commands at the same
time, are these same or different?
• What are the reasons behind conflicting action?
• Which are the sensors influencing conflicting commands?
• Has any sensor measurement gone beyond normal range?
If yes, how many times did that happen and how long did
it last?
• Are there more than two actions affecting the same
environment feature?
A. Example
In order to illustrate how PLC-PROV will operate, we
provide a short example of an attack scenario. Consider the
floorplan shown in Figure 4 which includes a secure, access-
controlled area in the lower-left corner. In this scenario, we
consider the policy that security doors should only be unlocked
when presented with a valid access card and in an emergency
when human life is at stake. In our scenario, we have PLCs
controlling various aspects of our smart building. The first
we call our safety PLC which contains a smoke detector as an
input. The output of this PLC is connected to an alarm system
and to our security PLC. The security PLC has a card reader
as input and a lock control on its output. Finally, we have the
1https://www.codesys.com/
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Fig. 3. Provenance Model for PLC-based System
Fig. 4. Notional office floorplan with a secure area that is access controlled and environmentally monitored.
environmental PLC which monitors environmental conditions
(such as temperature and humidity). As a safety mechanism,
when hazards are detected that require evacuation, security
doors should be unlocked to ensure no one is locked in the
building, also allowing first responders to clear all areas.
Given this setup, we now consider an attacker that wishes to
gain physical access to the secured areas within the building. In
order to gain access, the attacker first poses as a maintenance
technician to gain access to the common areas of the building.
From here, he connects to the PLC network and forges a sensor
reading from the smoke alarm indicating a hazard condition
in the secure area. This hazard condition triggers the alarm
to evacuate the secure area, which also causes the doors to
unlock. In this scenario, the attacker can use the unlock and
evacuate behavior to gain access to the secure area.
PLC-PROV aids the adminstrators in detecting this attack
in the following way. As it monitors the flow of inputs and
outputs of the system, it would take into account context.
There are several indicators that something is likely wrong.
One, smoke detector alarms will typically correspond to a rise
in temperature as well, which won’t be present in the attack
scenario. If the attacker is smart enough, he can simulate this
behavior. However, another indication of malicious behavior is
that the smoke detector signal and temperature readings would
have to be present in the secure space and that means that the
smoke detector reading at the PLC would be on a specific input
line. However, since the attacker doesn’t have access to the
space, they have to fake the measurement from another point
within the control network. Here we assume that the PLCs
controlling the secured space are located within the secured
space itself, as is typical practice in building secure areas,
while the environmental PLCs are located in the common areas
of the building to allow technicians to gain access. This is
depicted in Figure 4 with the upper-left block representing the
enivonmental PLC cabinet and the lower-right block in the
secure area representing the security PLC cabinet. It is also
assumed that in order for the alarm from the environmental
sensors to reach the secure area that there is a connection
between the two cabinets. By monitoring the flow of inputs and
outputs, PLC-PROV would be able to detect this deviation in
known good behavior and flag it as anomalous, further alerting
building personnel to the potential issue. In this way, we can
ensure that safety and security policies are not violated.
IV. RELATED WORK
The closest work to PLC-PROV is PROV-CPS [25] where
provenance was collected from resource-constrained embed-
ded devices of the cyber-physical system. However, this
research collects provenance from sensors only to identify
anomalous measurements. On the contrary, apart from collect-
ing provenance from the sensor measurement, our work covers
the actions of the actuators and the dependencies among the
PLCs in finding malicious activities. Our approach is complete
in expressing the causality and dependencies among the data
objects through the provenance graph. Another notable work
in this area is ProvThings [26] where a provenance collection
framework is proposed for IoT apps and devices. ProvThings
presents an automated instrumentation mechanism for IoT
apps and device APIs. The collected provenance is then
used to generate explanations for “why” a particular action
occurred. Our work captures provenance data for all sensors
and actuators in order to detect safety and security policy
violations.
There have been several other attempts to deploy security
policies with static verification, dynamic verification, and the
hybrid of these two approaches. Static verification (model
checking) is proposed in TSV [27] where a middleware
ensures the safety of a PLC-based system sitting between
PLC and the devices. TSV verifies the safety behavior of the
code executed on PLC before commands reach the actuators.
The safety properties are written in temporal logic which is
verified using model checking. While this work verifies the
system’s behavior, there are some other works that started
the verification from PLCs’ source program [28], [29]. Later,
others proposed mechanism to automatically generate formal
models from PLC programs [30], [31], [32], [33], [34].
While static analysis performs the verification before the
PLC program is released for operation (i.e. compile-time),
dynamic analysis ensures that policies are not violated at run-
time. C2 [35] introduced an enforcement mechanism for safety
policies in PLC-based system. When a PLC issues a command
to an actuator, the current states of the system are checked
and then decisions are made whether or not the command
should be issued through their enforcement mechanism, C2.
In this work, concerns about the size of the trusted computing
base (TCB) and state explosion in the model checking were
expressed. [36] addresses reduces the size of the TCB con-
siderably, and merges the static and dynamic analysis of TSV
and C2. The works by McLaughlin, et. al. focus specifically on
safety properties. This was subsequently extended in [37] with
an effort to find malicious PLC programs. Another approach to
dynamic analysis is proposed in [38] using Interval Temporal
Logic (ITL) and the Tempura framework, which aims to
provide early alerts in PLC-based systems.
Later, this work was extended in [39] where an
ITL/Tempura definition of a Siemens S7-1200 PLC ladder
logic was presented. Their developed monitoring methodology
captures a snapshot of the current state (with values for
markers, input, output, counters, and timers) of the PLC.
Tempura was implemented to execute on an Arduino Uno
connected to the PLC, ensuring that the PLC does not need a
powerful computing node to perform the computations.
While static analysis has proven promising, the number
of possible inputs and outputs for a PLC system can lead
to a state explosion. Furthermore, dynamic analysis suffers
from a coverage problem, where only executed code paths are
verified. Symbolic execution can minimize the state space, but
cannot guarantee complete verification of outputs (actuation
command) from input sets (sensor measurement). For these
reasons, what is needed is a mechanism that can provide
high-level safety and security policy descriptions that can be
enforced at run-time where the appropriate context can be
considered.
V. CONCLUSION
This project focuses on the integration of data provenance
in PLC controlled system in order to detect safety policy vio-
lation there. We have modeled data provenance that considers
operator (through HMI) input, command execution, actuators’
state, and sensors’ measurement. Therefore, we claim that our
model is complete in expressing the causality and dependen-
cies among the data objects in a PLC-controlled system. We
evaluated our model with smart building environment. It turns
out that data provenance has great potential applicability in
PLC controlled system where the change of sensor measure-
ment and actuator actions take place very frequently. Despite
being used in critical infrastructures, PLCs have little or almost
no security. The integration of plc-prov is capable of enforcing
adequate safety and security policies.
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